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Introduction
The fiscal capacity of an economy can be defined as the potential ability of its governments to raise revenues from its own sources to finance public goods and services. In other terms fiscal capacity corresponds to the potential ability of an economy to collect revenues. It is influenced by the economic structure of the country, state or municipality and by the availability of taxable resources (tax bases).
On the other hand, fiscal effort can be defined as the degree to which a government uses the revenue bases available to it. It is affected by the level of the tax rates applied, by the level of exemptions granted, and by the tax enforcement effort implemented by the tax administration authorities. The level of fiscal effort is typically measured as the ratio of the actual amount of revenues collected to some measure of fiscal capacity.
There are a variety of methods to measure an economy's fiscal capacity. The most obvious one is to use revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity. Current revenue collections is however a poor proxy for fiscal capacity. This measure does not recognize that the amount of revenue collections is affected both by an economy's fiscal capacity and its fiscal effort. Regions with a smaller tax base will have a more limited potential ability to raise revenues but also will regions with a larger tax base but low tax enforcement effort. Besides, the use of revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity can imply a perverse incentive to economies to lower their fiscal effort. If the central government decides that revenue collections should be the measure of fiscal capacity, and therefore should be used in the allocation of equalization grants, regions would have an incentive to collect less revenue from their own sources. The voters would be pleased with lower levels of taxations, and the revenue shortfall would be offset by an increased level of transfers from the central government.
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A different approach would be to integrate revenue collections and availability of tax bases as measures of the fiscal capacity in each municipality given the per-capita resources spent on that end. The great advantage of the use of such indicators is that they take into account explicitly the monetary effort for tax collection of each unit as inputs and two components of the fiscal capacity as outputs.
2 More importantly, these two measures of fiscal output can be used as criteria for the allocation of equalization grants. For instance, regions with low revenues collected and low tax bases could receive a higher level of conditional transfers from the central government.
The purpose of the paper is to investigate the effect of such intergovernmental transfers on the fiscal capacity of the 3,359 Brazilian municipalities in 2004. In particular we construct efficiency scores in tax collection for each unit, taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -revenue collection -and the proportion of workers on the local informal economy -availability of tax bases. Next, we build an instrument for intergovernmental transfers using the rules established on the Brazilian Constitution in 1988 to transfer unconditional funds among municipalities. The results suggest that federal transfers to municipalities negatively affect the efficiency scores. This leads to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect. Higher transfers from the federal government might induce less efficiency in local tax collection.
Although the empirical literature widely regards the flypaper effect as a refutation of the government's rationality, since it is argued that government's allocation is different from that of private agents in the presence of transfers, Becker (1994) has recently disputed its existence. 3 She argues that the ´´fiscal illusion`` of the flypaper effect is nothing but an econometric artifact, usually associated with misspecification biases. This paper also addresses this issue and presents alternative specifications of the main model.
The paper is organized in four sessions. The second session explains the rationale for the instrument variable and how it is built. The third session presents the empirical estimates. The fourth session concludes.
Instrumental variable
As explained above, the local government may have incentives to collect less revenue from their own sources in order to receive higher transfers. Or at least they can be less efficient in tax collection if that action can imply higher grants received. This is a typical endogeneity problem in econometrics and we attempt to solve it by building an instrumental variable. This variable must be correlated with tax collection efficiency only through the instrumented variable and not correlated with the residuals. In addition, this identification strategy is also attractive because the possible selection on ``unobservables``, i.e., a municipality may be receiving a specific amount of transfers due to the political power of his mayor, not observed by the researcher. The creation of this variable aims to eliminate these biases. We try to address below why this is the case for Brazil.
The Brazilian municipalities can decide upon fines, exemptions and tax rates on two specific taxes: the service tax (ISS) and the residential property tax (IPTU).
Another source of revenues is the intergovernmental transfers that could come from the state and federal spheres.
Brazilian municipalities depend heavily on transfers as a source of revenues.
According to the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 1993, tax revenues represent only 18% of total revenue in average for Brazilian municipalities. This large volume of transfers received by Brazilian municipal governments led Shah (1994, p. 42) to argue that "municipal governments in Brazil (...) should be the envy of all [local] governments in developing, as well as industrial countries".
Given that the "rules" used to transfer resources from the states and central government to the municipalities change constantly, these different rules turn the use of unconditional transfers as instrument endogenous 4 . From an historical perspective it is possible to see that the transference of resources from one sphere to another in Brazil and the rules establishing their amount, are the result of either political dissatisfaction with the actual rule of distribution at that time or to take into account time variations of the variables used in the redistribution criteria. For instance, the actual rule of resources distribution considers the level of population (the only criterion for municipalities other than states' capitals) and per-capita income (both are used in the case of capitals').
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These two variables adjust annually for Brazilian municipalities and consequently the coefficients of redistribution among municipalities might adjust as well.
The problem is that these coefficients adjustments can be correlated with unobservable variables and consequently with the decision of tax collection. In particular, if the variation of these two criteria implies a decrease in the transfers' participation of a particular municipality, they can claim an attenuation of this loss.
Depending on their political status (whether they are supported-amparado -capitals or reserva) they can get a different formula for adjustment. Also, that formula has been corrected three times since its first implementation 6 . Therefore, a municipality whose Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that any stock effect has been reduced.
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The instrument is build as following. First, we collect data on federal government revenues that come mostly from two taxes in 2004: income tax and a tax on industrialized products (IPI), which is a consumer tax. Next, we multiply this amount by 
Empirical Estimates
3.1.Data and Efficiency Scores
The full description of data characteristics are on the appendix. Concerning the efficiency scores computation, inputs are defined as capital and labor. 12 We use the capital investments per-capita from 1980 and 2004 accumulated and depreciated by the rate of 3% as a proxy for capital (K). 13 For labor (L) we use the number of both indirect and direct public workers per capita in the municipalities.
Regarding the output, we consider local tax revenue per capita (T) and the proportion of workers in the informal economy (I).
14 These variables allow us to calculate input and output relative efficiency scores whose range goes from 0 to 1. Every municipality on the Production Possibility Frontier receives the maximum score 1. For instance, the input efficiency score of a unit means how much less input could be used to obtain the same level of output. Similarly, the output efficiency score calculates how much more output could be produced given the amount of input.
This paper utilizes the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) methodology to compute those scores and it is described on the appendix. 15 The major advantage of FDH analysis is that it imposes only weak assumptions on the production technology but still allows for comparison of efficiency levels among producers. It is necessary to assume that reduction of the inputs (outputs) with the same technology maintaining the output (input) fixed across municipalities are made. The production set is not necessarily convex. That guarantees the existence of a continuous FDH which is going to be used as a dependent variable to identify the best practices in government tax collection, that is, to asses what are the factors increase (relative) efficiency. We claim that using such structure, allows us to exclude the tax-price effect on the tax collection determinants.
Suppose that we want to estimate the determinants of tax collection in two similar units of observation. In one of them twice as much is spent on tax collection activities compared to the other. If the two units are similar in their characteristics, we expect to have the double amount of revenue collected in that unit whose expenditure in tax collection is higher. That unit can audit more; can spend more money in training the auditors, etc. We must take into consideration the cost/effort to collect tax in the municipalities to compute the determinants of tax collection. The cost to collect tax is the price paid to generate tax revenue and availability of tax base. By using FDH methodology, we rank the municipalities tax collection activity considering their input (price).
The results are summarized on 
Empirical estimates of the flypaper effect
The data describe in the last section allows us to write the tax collection efficiency function below: Becker (1996) argues that most of the inflated biases on the flypaper effect estimates are due to misspecification modeling. To address this issue, we also consider a logarithmic version of the model above,
The main problem associated to this estimation concerns the endogeneity of the level of transfers received by each municipality. As described above, regions with low revenues collected and low tax bases could receive a higher level of transfers from the central government and have the incentives to do so.
Therefore, an alternative method is first to regress the level of transfers that is endogenous (Transf) on the constructed instrument (Transftab) and the controls. Then we can use that predicted value back on equations (1) and (2). 19 Equations (3) Table 3 presents the results for the first stage, that is, the one associated to the calculation of the instrument. The instrument is significant and valid since its exclusion from the above regressions reduces dramatically the adjusted R 2 (omitted here). Table 4 presents the regressions estimates considering efficiency scores .We use three outputs for tax collection: both tax revenue and availability of tax base and separately a) tax revenue b) availability of tax base. The results suggest that the intergovernamental transfer have a negative and statistically significant impact on the efficiency score in tax collection for most of the models. This leads to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect, i.e, the higher the level of transfers to the municipalities, the lower incentives they have to increase the efficiency in tax collection. In other words, weighting for the cost of tax collection (the inputs are capital and labor, defined in the FDH section), transfers causes a reduction in tax collection.
Interestingly, we do not have this result only in the logarithmic part of the model (II). As argued in Becker (1996) , the choice of the model influences the significance of the flypaper effect on traditional models of expenditure determinants and the logarithmic form reduces the significance of the flypaper effect. In our case, when the amount of tax revenue is the only output we replicate her intuition. This seems to be reasonable because in that model where tax revenue is the only output, we have a dependent variable that we can think in equilibrium is equivalent as local expenditures.
However, we dispute that the objective of tax collection is exclusively tax revenues. It should also include availability of tax bases. In this case, when both are included as tax collection outputs, then our results are robust to model specifications. One can note that for $1 of additional transfer we have a decrease in efficiency scores from 0.00002 to 0.000235 (excluding the positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in model (II)). This means that intergovernamental transfers lead to an increase in the distance in efficiency terms between the unit in question and the most efficient municipality.
Most of control variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign.
For instance, comparative advanced systems of tax collection are associated positively with efficiency scores, higher income levels can influence positively or negatively the tax collection efficiency. Since we are considering not only tax revenue, but also availability of tax base measured by proportion of workers in the informal economy, higher income levels might be associated with high local informal economies and, therefore, lower efficiency scores.
Last, we present estimations using an instrumented Tobit model. This estimation aims to capture the fact that our endogenous variable (efficiency scores) lies between 0 and 1. The results in Table 6 confirm our main results reinforcing the evidence of a negative flypaper effect on efficiency scores. The results are invariant to the model chosen. 
Conclusions
This Similarly, in terms of output, municipality i can be ranked in relation to the most efficient (3)
The procedure can be summarized as follows. First a producer is selected. Then all producers that are more efficient than it are marked. For every pair of producers containing the unit under analysis and the more efficient one is computed a score for each input (dividing the input of the unit under analysis and the more efficient one). Then select the more efficient producer that brings the unit under analysis closest to the frontier. The calculation of the input efficiency score can be illustrated with an example. Suppose 3 producers with a 2-input 2-output case. A (20, 33; 15, 10), B(19, 30, 16,12), C(25, 32 ; 16, 11) . The first two numbers denotes inputs while the last two numbers yield outputs. A is less efficient than B -A uses more of both inputs while its outputs is smaller. However, C is not more efficient than A. The input score for A can be calculated in the table below. Observe that since C is not compared to neither A and B, it gets score equal to 1. B also receives 1 because it is more efficient than A and there is no other municipality more efficient than it is. 
A.2. Data Description
In order to identify the variables associated with the differences in the efficiency of taxes collected among the municipalities we select initially:
a. Ideology -Despite the literature mentions the effect of the ideology of the governments on taxation, there is no evidence relating ideology and tax revenue efficiency and informality together. Messere (1993) argues that center-right governments generally tend to choose a lower total tax burden , with more consumer taxes than income taxes. On the other hand, leftwing governments tend to favor a higher size of the government which implies a higher tax burden, with more income taxes than consumption taxes. Pommerehne and Scheneider (1983) analyzes Australia during the 70s and argues that right-wing governments tend to have less direct taxes and a lower tax/GDP ratio, while left-wing governments tend to have more indirect taxes and a higher tax/GDP ratio. b. Technology -As Sousa et al (2005) argue from the expenditure view, technology helps to increase efficiency. We use two dummy variables as "proxy" for the existence of technology: tax service data set computerized (ISSinform) and the services from municipalities to contributors through Internet, portal or web-page (serint, source: Pesquisa de Informações Básicas Municipais, IBGE , 2004 ) ii .
c. Fiscal impacts -Certainly a municipality that has an expense level higher searches for a higher level of tax revenue. That could lead to higher tax collection efficiency.
iii On the other hand, the higher the transfers to the municipalities from either the federal or state government the higher the incentives to spend (flypaper effect), and the lower is the incentive to search for efficiency. We construct two variables to capture these effects. We consider the local expenditure per capita (exp), and to observe the effect of the transfers into the model, we include the transfers per capita of both the state and municipal governments (transf). The data of expenditure and transfers are from Ipeadata (2004) iv and the population data are extracted from the Pesquisa de Informações Básicas Municipais (IBGE, 2004 (Ipeadata, 1995) , the data are taken from Ipeadata (2000) .
e. Characteristics of the residents -It is very common to observe pensioner exemption in the Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano (IPTU -the most important urban territorial tax collected from the municipalities) or as Rodríguez (2004) 1 Another obvious measure of fiscal capacity is the per capita level of income since the most important source of revenue for a government is the income of its taxpaying residents. The main drawback of this measure is that it fails to account for the ability of governments (especially sub nationals) to tax economic resources or economic rents owned by residents outside their jurisdictions. Other possibilities are the gross regional product, and measures closely related to it as the total taxable resources and the representative tax system. Starting from the gross regional product one has, for example, to subtract certain federal taxes to arrive to the total taxable resources once these funds are unavailable to regional and local governments as a source of revenue 2 However, it allows one to obtain only the comparative efficiency scores for the sample analyzed. predicted in 2005 is -0,009. 12 In a previous version of this paper, total municipality's expenditures per capita is also used as input. The results are available upon request. 13 We test alternatives rates of depreciation: 5% e 8%. The results are similar. 14 There is a distinction between formal (CLT) and informal workers in Brazil. The informal workers do not have the legal right of job tenure. We could say that their job tenure is more precarious than that of formal workers. The expression 'CLT' has its origin in Law 5452 of May of 1943, entitled the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT in Portuguese). This law establishes the rules of labor relations in the private sector. The data used to build the variable tax-collect was taken from Ipeadata (2004) . The variable that captures informality (inf) is taken from the CENSO (2000) . 15 FDH is a non-parametric technique proposed by Deprins, Simar e Tulkens (1984) . Two other methodologies are also used in the literature. First, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is also non-parametric and builds envelops from the efficient points on the frontier differently from the FDH explained above. See, for instance Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) and Herrera and Pang (2005) and Sousa, Cribari-Neto, Stosic and Borko (2005) for analysis of expenditure efficiency. Second, a parametric approach denominated stochastic frontier computes the frontier using regression techniques. This method assumes error distributions (see Greene (2003) ). Alfirman (2003) estimate the tax potential of two sources of revenue for Indonesian local governments (local taxes and property tax) using the analysis of stochastic frontier. 16 We show the results by State to permit more general conclusions. Results for each municipality are available upon request. 17 The complete estimates are available upon request. 18 The choice of these variables is uncontroversial and matches the empirical literature. For a survey on this topic see Bailey and Connolly (1998) . We also created a dummy variable that captures whether a municipality has a high public debt according to the Fiscal Responsibility Law 2000 (LRF -Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal) . This variable is statistically insignificant. 19 These two steps process are run simultaneously to avoid inconsistent estimates of the variance term. i See also Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993) that establish the relative efficiency municipalities for Belgium. Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) consider the efficiency in education and health expenditures for Africa countries.
ii We also test the possibility of residential property tax data set computerized (IPTUinform) and the results show that this variable is not significant. iii The literature shows only that higher governments are more inefficient on expenditures. See Herrera and Pang (2005) and Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) . iv Site: www.ipeadata.gov.br
